Theescalation of conflict in the Middle East since late February 2026, particularly the disruption to transit through the Strait of Hormuz, has once again brought force majeure clauses into sharp commercial focus.

Forthose advising across London and the Gulf, there is a familiar tension at play. The scale of the disruption is undeniable, but under English law, scale is not the point.

Force majeure is not a doctrine of general relief, it is a matter of contract.

The instinct versus the law

In moments of geopolitical instability, there is often an instinct, particularly among businesses operating across jurisdictions that the law will accommodate the reality on the ground. However, English law does not.

It does not respond to events because they are serious, unforeseen or widely disruptive. It responds to the allocation of risk the parties agreed, often in very different market conditions, when the contract was signed.

That distinction is not academic. It is where most force majeure arguments are either won or lost.

The Strait of Hormuz: disruption is not enough

The current disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is precisely the kind of event parties have in mind when negotiating force majeure clauses. Reduced vessel movements, congestion and damage to infrastructure have a tangible impact on performance. But the legal question is narrower: does the clause cover this type of event? And has it actually affected performance in the way the clause requires?

In many cases, the answer is less straightforward than parties expect.

The clause does the work

From an English law perspective, everything turns on the wording.

Clauses framed around performance being “prevented” set a high bar. Delay, disruption or increased cost will not usually suffice. Where clauses refer to “hindrance” or “delay”, there is more room for argument. But even then, the analysis remains grounded in the specific obligation in question.

A recurring issue in the current environment is that disruption sits in transit, not at the point of loading or delivery. Many clauses are not drafted with that distinction in mind. That is where the friction emerges.

Causation: the uncomfortable question

It is not enough to point to the conflict. The party relying on force majeure must show that the event actually caused its inability to perform. That requires a level of evidential discipline which, in fast-moving situations, is often overlooked.

Could the cargo have moved, albeit differently? Could alternative routes have been used? Was performance truly prevented or simply more difficult, slower, or more expensive?

English law is clear: the line between impossibility and inconvenience matters. And it is rigorously applied.

Mitigation in a constrained environment

Most clauses require reasonable steps to overcome the impact of the event.

In the context of the Middle East, that may mean longer routes, alternative ports, or substitute supply arrangements. None of these are commercially attractive. Some are operationally complex. However, they are precisely the questions the law will ask.

There are limits. A party is not required to accept fundamentally different performance, but where that line falls is rarely obvious and often becomes the central issue in dispute.

The procedural point that still trips parties up

If there is one area where parties continue to fall short, it is notice. Force majeure clauses routinely impose strict notification requirements: timing, form, content. In many cases, these operate as conditions precedent. In a volatile regional situation, those requirements are easily missed. The consequences are not.

A well-founded force majeure claim can fail on a technicality and frequentlydoes.

The contract chain problem

For those trading across the region, the most acute risk often sits in contract chains.

An upstream supplier affected by disruption in the Strait of Hormuz may be entitled to invoke force majeure. That does not mean the position can be passed downstream.

Unless contracts are aligned on a back-to-back basis, the result is predictable: exposure sits in the middle.

Critically,the availability of alternative supply even at significantly increased cost maybe enough to prevent reliance on force majeure further down the chain.

A note of caution

Declaring force majeure is not a neutral act. If the clause does not apply, the declaration itself may constitute a repudiatory breach. In volatile markets, that is a serious risk, both legally and commercially.

The pressure to act quickly is understandable but the cost of getting it wrong can be material.

A familiar conclusion, in unfamiliar circumstances

There is a certain consistency in how English law approaches these situations.

However significant the geopolitical backdrop, the outcome turns on the same questions: what does the contract say? can the facts be brought within it? has the party complied with its requirements?

For those operating between London and the Middle East, that discipline can feel at odds with the realities on the ground, but it is precisely that discipline which gives English law its predictability and its continued dominance in cross-border trade.

The parties best placed in the current environment will not be those most affected by the disruption, but those whose contracts and internal processes were prepared for it.